I
n 1999, the Institute of Medicine's To Err is Human report first placed the spotlight on preventable medical errors in US hospitals. 1 Since then, the patient safety movement has witnessed a paradigm shift from its focus on freedom from medical errors, which may not be identifiable or result in patient harm, to a more expansive focus on freedom from all patient harm-physical, psychological, and social-resulting from any cause. [2] [3] [4] Over the years, modest progress has been made by several delivery and payment reforms launched at the national level, state level, and local level to reduce the occurrence of such harm that is acquired by patients during hospital stay. 2 One such initiative is the Hospital-Acquired Condition-Present on Admission (HAC-POA) Program of 2008 (hereafter called Program), which is among the earliest federal programs to link financial disincentives to the occurrence of HACs among Medicare patients. 5 Mandated by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, this Program removes accounting for the cost of care for HACs (such as catheterassociated urinary tract infections) in hospital reimbursement. In fiscal year 2015, the scope of this Program included 14 HACs that met legislative requirements of being high cost or high volume or both; leading to reassignment of the hospitalization episode to a higher paying Medical SeverityDiagnosis Related Group; and being reasonably preventable by use of evidence-based guidelines. 6 Estimates suggest that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) would save at least $146 million annually by withholding reimbursement for incremental HAC costs, 7 with costs ranging from $6913 per catheter-associated urinary tract infection (UTI) to $12,378 per catheter-associated bloodstream infection (BSI). 6 The overarching aim of the Program is to motivate hospitals to strengthen their structures and processes in line with evidence-based practices, thereby decreasing the risk of HACs. 8, 9 Prior national studies have found mixed resultssome have attributed decline in rates of catheter-associated BSIs, catheter-associated UTIs, and deep vein thrombosis/ pulmonary embolism to implementation of the Program, 10, 11 whereas other studies found no evidence of intended Program effects. [12] [13] [14] However, these studies have limitations, key among which are that they examined Program effects on heterogenous patient groups (eg, medical and surgical patients together), [11] [12] [13] [14] or utilized control groups that were not within the scope of the Program but may have been sensitive to spillover effects of the Program, 10,12 thereby confounding identification of independent Program effects. Importantly, these studies do not explicitly account for a "dose-response" effect, 15 whereby hospitals at risk of greater financial impact are likely to be more sensitive to the Program. Furthermore, a rigorous analysis of this Program is important in light of more recent programs such as the Value Based Purchasing Program (VBP), 16 the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), 17 and the Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program (HACRP) 18 that align financial reimbursements to quality and safety performance of hospitals, but substantially differ in design, approach, and magnitude of incentives from the HAC-POA Program.
Our study addresses the aforementioned limitations by evaluating the longitudinal impact of the Program on development of HACs for a cohort of Medicare inpatients with primary diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, pneumonia, or stroke. We also specify control groups that are not sensitive to spillover effects of the Program and use the Medicare utilization ratio (MUR, the proportion of inpatient days financed by Medicare), as a measure of the magnitude of financial impact of the Program. 19 We hypothesize that after controlling for patient characteristics, hospital factors, and secular trends, the HAC Program is directly associated with a decline in development of HACs, and that this decline is greater among hospitals with a higher Medicare load.
METHODS

Data and Study Population
We used the 2005-2012 Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project's (HCUP) State Inpatient Database for New York (NY), 20 which has included the POA indicator since the mid 90s. In NY, the POA indicator is known to have high face validity. 21 We linked the HCUP files to other hospitallevel files such as CMS' Impact Files (for MUR) and Cost Reports (for operating profit margin); Dartmouth Atlas database (for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index); and Hospital Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS) EHR database 22 (for Electronic Medical Record Adoption Model proxy). The initial dataset contained 20,926,036 inpatient stays. We excluded stays from hospitals that were not reimbursed by the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (n = 77,844), were not financed by Medicare Part A (n = 905,199), and were for patients younger than 65 years (n = 13,856,610).
To limit heterogeneity in the study sample, we used the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) diagnoses codes to identify stays with primary diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, pneumonia, or stroke (eTable 1, Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links. lww.com/MLR/B323) (n = 869,598). The clinical importance of these conditions is underscored by their life-threatening and disability-inducing potential among elderly patients. Furthermore, these conditions account for 13%-15% of inpatient stays for Medicare beneficiaries, 23 and thereby have substantial financial implications for CMS and hospital revenues.
We further excluded stays that were missing data points for certain key variables that include hospital identification numbers (n = 1277), discharge month in 2008 (n = 694), and type of admission (n = 43). Our final analytic cohort comprised of 867,584 inpatient stays from 159 hospitals.
Study Variables
Outcomes: HACs
We used ICD-9-CM Diagnosis Codes specified by the Program to identify observations with HACs that were applicable to the cohort. These include BSI, UTI, falls and trauma (FAL), poor glucose control (GLU), air embolism, and blood incompatibility that were coded as secondary diagnoses 6 (eTable 2, Supplemental Digital Content 1, http:// links.lww.com/MLR/B323). We then used the POA indicator to ascertain whether the secondary diagnoses of interest were present or not at admission. Stays with POA codes of N (indicating that the condition was not present at the time of admission) or U (indicating that documentation is insufficient to determine if the condition was present at the time of admission) for HAC-related ICD-9-CM diagnosis codes were marked as stays that developed HACs. 24 The primary outcome was a binary any-or-none HAC indicator for each stay, with 1 indicating that at least 1 of the 6 HACs developed during hospital stay. 25 The secondary outcomes of interest were each of the 6 HACs. As the ICD-9-CM codes for BSI were introduced in October 2007, the anyor-none indicator and BSI are constructed using data from October 2007 onward. The other HAC indicators are constructed using data from January 2005 onward. Computing an any-or-none indicator has reasonable validity for quantifying the underlying latent construct of safety. HACs are relatively infrequent, yet they are unintended and undesirable outcomes of care for both patients and providers. Furthermore, preventing a HAC from occurring typically requires a multidisciplinary systems approach. Inadequate synergy in the system is likely to contribute not only to the occurrence of HACs of interest, but also to other harmful events that are not under the purview of the Program.
For descriptive analysis, we computed hospital-level HAC rates as a percentage of all eligible stays that developed a particular HAC. We averaged these hospital-level rates by months, MUR quartiles, and Program phase.
Key Independent Variable
We modeled the Program effect using an interaction between the Program phase (pre-Program/post-Program) and prespecified MUR quartiles. Inpatient stays with discharges before October 1, 2008 were included in the pre-Program cohort. As the Program is designed to target hospital Medicare reimbursements, it is reasonable to speculate that the Program may have differential effect across hospitals with varying Medicare load. We used MUR to quantify this exposure of a hospital to the Program for the following reasons. Elderly Medicare patients are at a greater risk of harm on account of larger number of comorbid conditions, frailty, and interactions of multiple caregiving teams. 26 Thus, hospitals with longer staying elderly patients, and consequently with higher MUR, are at a greater risk of financial losses from the Program. Furthermore, MUR is utilized by CMS for calculating annual updates to the reimbursement that hospitals receive. Thus, hospitals with higher MUR can be expected to have a more robust response to the Program. We constructed a time-constant measure of MUR by computing its mean for the hospital during the pre-Program phase to address potential endogeneity of the MUR variable to the outcomes.
Covariates
In multivariate analysis, we controlled for patient-level and hospital-level variables that could potentially influence the incidence of HACs and overall care quality. Patient-level covariates include age, sex, race, primary payer, admission status, admission source, and 29 binary indicators for comorbidities defined according to the modified Elixhauser algorithm. 27 Hospital-level covariates include hospital ownership, medical school affiliation, geographic location, number of beds, and operating profit margin, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for market concentration. 28 We also controlled for disproportionate patient percent, which is used by CMS to identify Disproportionate Share Hospitals and is indicative of the mix of uninsured and underinsured patients in a hospital 29 ; transfer-adjusted case-mix index which is the average weight of Medical Severity-Diagnosis Related Groups for Medicare patients in a hospital that is adjusted for patients transferred to postacute care facilities, and is indicative of the complexity of patients and resources used in care 30 ; registered nurse staffing per average daily census ratio; and a measure for EHR functionalities of a hospital to match the Electronic Medical Record Adoption Model of the HIMSS. 31 eTable 3 (Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.com/MLR/B323) contains definitions and specifications for certain covariates included in the models.
Statistical Analysis
We used hierarchical logistic regression to estimate difference-in-differences models that examine change in incidence of HACs in the post-Program phase as compared with the pre-Program phase across hospitals with varying MUR (Appendix, Supplemental Digital Content 2, http:// links.lww.com/MLR/B326). By using this analytic strategy we isolate the independent effect of the Program after controlling for secular trends, other contemporaneous quality initiatives, and unobserved differences between "treatment" and "control" groups that may confound identification of the direct Program effect. All models used hospital random effects and robust SEs to account for clustering of patient outcomes within hospitals. A key assumption underlying difference-in-differences estimation is that trends in outcomes of the MUR groups are parallel before start of the Program, and would have remained so had the Program not been implemented. We tested this assumption with an interaction between the MUR quartile and year of discharge in models using the pre-Program data.
For stratified analyses, we reestimated models for the any-or-none indicator and individual HACs in each condition-specific stratum. We also conducted several sensitivity analyses. First, we evaluated short-term and longterm effects of the Program by dividing the post-Program phase into 2 periods. Second, we reclassified observations from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the pre-Program cohort to account for possible delays in initiation of quality improvement (QI) efforts in hospitals. Third, we excluded observations from 2008 as determining the implementation date for a hospital may be challenging given that hospitals may have initiated QI efforts in anticipation of the Program. Fourth, to address potential skewing of estimates due to hospitals with low case volume, we reestimated our models by excluding hospitals with <20 inpatient stays of interest, and by weighting our models by number of beds in a hospital. Fifth, to address potential endogeneity that could be introduced by some of the hospital-level covariates, we reestimated our models by fixing values of such variables at baseline. Finally, we reestimated the models by excluding observations from the last quarter of 2012 to address the influence of newer payment reforms.
The study was exempted from review by the University of Rochester Research Subject Review Board. All analyses were conducted with Stata/MP 14.1 for Unix. Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics for hospitals and stays in the cohort. Among the hospitals, 87% were not-for-profit, 47% had <200 beds, 70% were located in large urban areas, 60% were affiliated with a medical school, and 60% were located in competitive markets. The average disproportionate patient percent was 36% (standard deviation = 25), and transfer-adjusted case mix was 1.40 (SD = 0.25). Among the stays, 37% had congestive heart failure as the primary diagnosis, average age was 80.02 years (SD = 8.19), 54% were female, 68% were white, and the average number of comorbidities was Overall, the mean hospital-level rate for the any-or-none indicator declined 0.04 percentage points (from 0.23% in the prephase to 0.19% in the postphase) over the study period. The number of hospitals reporting at least 1 HAC increased from 58% in the prephase to 82% in the postphase. In both phases, hospitals in quartile 2 had the highest mean any-ornone HAC rate (0.34% in the prephase and 0.22% in the postphase), and the highest number of hospitals reporting at least 1 HAC (82% in the prephase and 89% in the postphase). The air embolism and blood incompatibility indicators did not demonstrate variability during the study period, and hence are excluded from further analysis. Table 4 presents multivariate Program/interaction effects for the 5 main logistic regression models. After controlling for patient-level and hospital-level covariates and hospital random effects, the Program was significantly associated with a 43% decline in relative odds of the anyor-none indicator (conditional odds ratio = 0.57; 95% confidence interval, 0.38-0.87; P = 0.009) for hospitals in quartile 2 as compared with hospitals in quartile 1, and with 70% decline in relative odds of UTI (conditional odds ratio = 0.30; 95% confidence interval, 0.12-0.75; P: 0.010) for hospitals in quartile 3 as compared with hospitals in quartile 1. We did not find significant Program/interaction effects in the main models for BSI, FAL, and GLU. The intraclass correlation coefficient for the models ranged from 5% for the any-or-none indicator and FAL models to 18% for the GLU and UTI models. eTable 6 (Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.com/MLR/B323) presents odds ratios for covariates included in the models.
RESULTS
Descriptive Analysis
Main Multivariate Analysis
Stratified and Sensitivity Analysis
In the stratified analyses (eTable 7, Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.com/MLR/B323), we noted that the Program was associated with significant decline in odds of the any-or-none indicator in the congestive heart failure and pneumonia cohort, of BSI in the pneumonia cohort, of UTI in the acute myocardial infarction cohort, and of GLU in the stroke cohort among MUR quartile 2 and 3 hospitals. The sensitivity analyses largely confirmed findings of the Program effects from the main models.
DISCUSSION
HACs not only result in physical harm and undesirable events such as readmissions, disability, and death, they also impose considerable psychological and economic strain on patients who are seeking cure from the primary disease. Comprehensive delivery and payment reforms are critical in preventing HACs from occurring. The central aim of our study was to evaluate whether financial disincentives of the HAC-POA Program prevented HACs from occurring. In overall and stratified analyses, we found modest evidence that the HAC-POA Program was significantly associated with decline in incidence of selected HACs in selected cohorts. These are the any-or-none indicator (overall, congestive heart failure, and pneumonia cohort), BSI (pneumonia cohort), UTI (overall and acute myocardial infarction cohort), and GLU (stroke cohort). The decline in these HACs occurred among hospitals with higher Medicare load (mainly in quartiles 2 and 3) and consequently at higher risk for financial losses from the Program. We did not identify Program-associated decline in incidence of FAL neither in the overall nor stratified analysis. We note that patient factors explained a greater proportion of variance in HACs, and that hospital-level factors have a significant yet limited role. Importantly, control of heterogeneity in the study sample, choice of control groups, a methodology that controls for other contemporaneous payment reforms, and modeling of the "dose-response" relationship are key study strengths.
There are several potential explanations for the intended Program effects that we noted. First, the Program is credited with increasing awareness of key hospital stakeholders toward HACs. [33] [34] [35] [36] This is an important first step, because awareness of the hospital management about HACs and about their clinical and financial consequences is expected to translate into changes in structures and processes, which ultimately facilitate better outcomes. 37 Second, 
